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A THEORY Of SYNERGY 
I - INTRODUCTION 

Several scholars hove recently stressed the importance of 
the concept of synergy (Anker. 1934; Singh una ~l(\ntgcmery. 19d7; 
Lubatkin, 1987; Hill and lloskbsOD, J987). Two reasonS have been 
advflnced~ First. increHsing levels of ecoHomic t technologic dlld 
competitive c01nplexity impose the :1eed to achieve higher 
strategic benefits un urganizatiocs (Ansoff. 1984; Thomas, 1(86). 
Second. it is becomin::;:; ir:creasingly accepted that corporate 
strategy must go beyond' t:le cash Ilk10agerncnt of EGG and similar 
models in orcer to creati':l a C01:lpctitive advaotage for the 
organit:.ation B:-" a 'Whole (Scherer, 1986; pnts~ 1985; Hammer mesh. 
1986). 
Synergy remains t however, an elusive concept. 
Accortling to Porter (l985J, l1ill defined notions of what 
constitutes synergy underlay many companies' acquisitions 
problen::/' (PP.318)~ Besides this conce;>tual problejJl,"ChattvrJee 
(1986) has. a Iso indicated tll~t, "A more r igorQus ft'iurework shou] d 
be developed which links the potentii-il for cr~'oting econou:ic 
value not only to the decision to diversify. but also to the type 
of acquisition (related or unrelated) and the ffiudc (de novo or 
acquisition) of diversification" (PP.138). 
Consequently, in order for the ,~oncept of syn<;rgy to be useflll 
one 2lust possess .1 t.heory of syrergy which states lJ, c€tailed 
terms it.s causes and the circ.umstances under which those causes 
are predicted to Pt> cspec iully strong (Singh and :·Iontgo!aery. 
1987). Such a detailed theory of syner3Y will lead to 
com:] usions about which acqul.s~tlon strategies greatest 
potential for creeting economic value (Salter and 11eiahold, 1979i 
Porter t 1987). 
Presenting such a theory of synergy is the aim of this 
paper. This paper wiiI: 
lst - devele'!J a ,-'ctailcd list of the causes of synergy_ 
2nd. - aggregate the dHferent causes, according to 
their nature into broader categories. 
3rd - predict when synergy will or ..ill not be created. 
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II - THE Cm;CEPT 0, SYXERGY 
A conct'pt should be defined by its roots and by its CO!l;;:lOfl 
• "S . .. (. . .).. husage. Synergy comes f rom t he :;1t"eeK ynergr.a JOlnt \-taCK WJue 
is derived from "syner,sein". LlA<-)oing. to work togetaer. rlcc*,pted 
sources such as the \;'eLster dictionary define. synergy i>b the 
combined or cooper-ati ve action of different forces, such as 
drugs in the human body I or the action of 'sever<ll orgillls to 
perform cQ1nplex -movement"" 
From the roots and common usage of the word synergy two 
basic points emerge: • 
1st - Synergy requires diversity, involving two or more 
agents, orgkl\\S, drugs, divitiioo$. etc. That is, one may speak of 
synergy only if there 1s diversity (Pitts, 1985; ;!Ul mid 
Hoskissol!. 1987) ,. 
2nd - There is nothing in the concept of synergy which 
-requires that the overall effect !}e greater t:hc;n the sum of the 
. 
parts • 
The concept of synergy requires werking together, it does 
not specify the end result,' Indc~tl. in ::nedicine two dru:;s can be 
used simultaneous] y, so thnt the effect of one,Pf t.he drugs 
partially ,offsets SONt: undesirable effect of thE' other drug. In 
the organizat ions field. Ansof f I 1965 and 198/.; ::ew;nan and Logan. 
1985; Scott 1980, ' and Sch~rer J979, r.ave all Pointed Olit t.hat 
synergy can be nega'tive (2+2:0;3) as welJ os positive (2+2=5). 
Consequently, syr:ergy should be defined as the coperative 
work of different PiJrts towards ,) common end (1). 1':l(S definition 
is in accord<lnce with that of authors suc-h as Day, J077, Haugen, 
1975; Ansoff, 1965; and Hill and liQskisson I 19B? ~ _ 
This definition enhances: 
A - Cooj?eratiun \;hich is related to resource sharing 
and consequentlY the parts cannot be totally autOl:omous. 
B - Parts of. eot the ~reater whole. to w:'1ich the parts 
belong 
c - Different r.ot equal~ and consequently the concept oft 
synergy de;r.arks itself from experience and size effect:,.. 
D - C9~ J:2J! and so synergy is distinct fror~ situations 
of parasitislr. suc!~ as one Si3U receiving funds frw:;' :mother SllU. 
One cannot speak of synergy unless the benefit of the first SoU is 
greater tha:1 the loss of the second "51m, so that the overall net 
effect is positive. 
H9re s;lccical1y. syncr3Y exists if over a certain period 
of time the performance of a diversified corporation is different 
from what the i;JVerage perfor;nnnce ot its (livisions would be 1£ 
they were ir,cc;:tende,H. busir.esses. 
(1) 
- implying a net result which can he greater or smdller than 
the sum of the ports. 
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Schematicolly, in the case of a corp>')ration with two equally 
sized divisions, one may speak of synergy. if 
LA + LIl 
LX = ..-----­
(A,B) 2 
•
where 
LX - Performance of a c!:iversified corporation :x: with divisions A 
and B (A,B). 
LA - Perform,mce of the division A if it was an independent 
business. 
LB - Performance of the division B if it was an independent 
business 
/
I 
How can we demonstrate that the performance .'0£ a diversified 
organization is be different from whClt the pt:!r'formance of its 
divisions would be- if, they were independent businesses? 
Let's hypothE>size that an organization i.s speduHzeu in 
market A at IT'.oment one, ;ind at mow_cnt . two, diver~Hies into 
market E· (through internal development or Bquibition}. Th" 
difference between the organization at moment on£: UWl t .. "t) can bl!" 
seen in: 
1 -,VQlur.e - the organization at moment two has a greater sales 

volume 

2 - lliversity - tht) organization has no.... built diversity into its 

operations, 

. If synergy exists it ~ust therefore be explained in terms of 
the consequences of th.e changes· in volu,l1l? and diversity 
experie:1ced by the oT...I'!anization. Concerning the impact on 
"voluCk', can distinguish she effects {w:lich are a consequence of 
sales per year) frO'll ex?erience effects (which def,end on the 
cu:nul ati ve vol urne of sules). 
Size and. experi.encc ef.fect~ will be observed as long as the 
organization (liversifies into related market::;, making possible 
the shlflring of rt~sourc-e.s C. warehouses, distribution systems, ­
mac.hinery, sales force etc.). ihese types of llffects: ('ould also 
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occur in the_ organization if it chose to remain 
specialized and grow in a single market. 
Diversity effects, on the other hrmct.· cun never he achieved 
within a sing:e mnrket. They re(',uire diver.sity within the 
organization in order to occur. gxar::ples are transfers of 
know-how among clivision~. reciprocal buying (where a division 
induces a supJ!1ier to bt:y from another division of the S8r:le 
compa:1Y), interdivisional cash managcr:\(mt,· and the trans/Jort of 
image from one It.arket to another. 
Since it is tbe joint effect of si.ze~ expeHence and diversity 
which explaiqs synergy. we shall next analyze these three 
effects in detail. 
• 
III • I - SIZE SFFECTS 
/ 
Table one presents a typology of size effe(ts~ l;,1hen a firm 
diversifies, if i,ncreases its siz",. and conse'quently certain 
advantages and d:isadv8fJt{1ges occur. He call both of these size 
effects. 
There are six main types of size advantage8: 0) reliance on 
strentghs. (2) inp',lt effects,(3) public gcoc.s,(4) econo;:lles of 
scal~. (5) ti1e law of great nUl:'.bers and. (6) market power. 
(l)Adam Smith. in bis work the rt::calth of Nations". observed that 
the amount of sp0cializatv.m is limited by tte size of a market. 
The same happens inside or-ganizations. Contrar{ to smaller 
organizations where workers tend to perform a lu-:ger nu:uber of 
tasks~ larger organizations allow for gr'1!Jter w-orker 
specialization. Since speCialization ....ill be bd",CU upon the 
workers f strentghs. prod UC' tivity w111 increase * Al so I due to 
specialization. 
.. training are now 
the tice and therefore the cost 
}Q\.Jer C ~obinson, 1978) 
required fOT 
(2) Size can also have a positive impact in terms of inputs. 
Larger firms pay lower price!l due to quantity discount$ from 
suppliers, greater ba'rgaining power due to monopsony. 
oligopsony. (lr the use of specialists in procuring various_ 
" 

types of raw :rlaterials nnd If.et"chamlise. Shopping around is more 

feasible when bl.ying large rather than small quantities due to 

transaction CQsts~ lis a consequence, l~rgcr firms have greater 

access to suppliers.(Pfeffer and Salancik t 1978; Archer nnd 

faerber, 1966 ). 

•(3) Economists define puhlic goods (as opposed to private 

goods) as the ty?e of goods \':hich cJn b'e used. by one entity 

(person. division), without affecting the usage that another 

entIty may make of the same goods. 

Exampl~s of. public goods within organizapons are property 
rights (copyrights. pate:1L:,.. trademarkB, leaseholds) and the 
visibility or -goodwill 0:: the organization. Sinc.e the marginal cost 
of using these types of goods is zero, size will represont :a 
benefit here too.(Abell and !iar:r.1ond. 1979) 
(4) As size increases, economies of scale occur. There are 

several reasons for this. 

/
, 
(A) First, there is the geometric law which states that as the 
area 	( of a bujlding, warehousL'. etc) doub"le-s, its volume 
increases threefold. Since cost is related to the area and 
the output to volume. a net benefit occurs as size 
increases {!Ialdi ane i~'hitcomb-. 1967 ). 
(B) The second cause of economies of' scalr~ refFlr(;s certain 
dis·:mtinuities between -cost and machinery ( Shephtf.r.:i. 1979); th.' 
price nf machinery increases less than propol'tio[,:"lly to its 
cap-acity (Scherer. 1979); and in larger orbanizat~ons it is 
economically conpensalor:l to mechanize SO':le operatior,s which 
are perfomed manually in smaller organizations (Pitts, 1986). 
(C). Fixed costs are a third cause of economies of scale. h'ith 

higher volume, the cost per unit of production of 

ancilatory' activities (such as security, medical department, 

food services, secretariill department. ~tc. ) decreases. 

These fixed costs are called accountants as indir.~:.:t expenses~ 
(5) Another size advantage camps from the statistical law of 

great numbers. As the number of buyers increases their variances 

in tents of idyosi:Jcracies and special characteristics 

diCiinish. Lo.ler variance among buyers means lower variance of 

_sales. The probnbility of, stockoJt is consequently lO\t,'er. 111eaning 
that costs of inventory will increHS~ less th;ln proportionallj 
to sales; (Whitin and PesLon, 1954 )_ 
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(6) Harket power is a final advi:lntagt:: of size. Larger firms 

influence their enviroo'IJents to n gteat extent. They can 

influence both thei r politicol environment (throup.J luwer 

probaBty of bankruptcy-Dooley. 1969) and their economic 

environment (by l)ushilli! thc·ix products more strotlgly into the 

market a.nd by charging higher pri<:es fat the!'.l) ~ ,There is evidence 

tnat with all else equal t larg(-! firms benefit from a superior 

image when compared to smaller fir;:,G a benefit which can be 

translated into premium prices.(Cooper. J979). 

Besides advantages, an increase in size can also bring some 

dlsadvantages'to organizations. 

(1). Larger organ'izations experience a lower sense of the need to 

survive. The int.err.al environr.lent of the f'rg.n.nizatioll b02cwrt!$ 

'increasingly ;>oHtic.81 as well (Blair. 1972. Towscnd. 1970). 

Consequently x -inefficiency arises ( Leibenstein, 1966). 

). 

- ~ (2) Transportution costs tend to be higher for )arger firms 

since they must go farther to obtain rdW ;nateri;)~s: components, 

energy and labor (Scherer ct. l;ll. 1975). 

(3) Size also means that information processing is increasingly 

conplex, requiring more elahorate infornation. control anJ 

structural Hrra:1gements~(Kotz and KBhn, 1978). 

(4) Hotivation can be more difficult in lar'~f2'r· organizfltiol'3 
because workers tend to identify and prefer tv wr:rk :in 
slI'.aller work units (Porter and Lowler, 1965; Quinn Gnd ;'langione, 
1913). 
(5) . The greater visibihty ex[)erienced by larger organizations 

may put them under Special surveiLl<Jnce of (:oll$umer groups and 

under a hiSher threat of antitrust. It ca:-J therefore be said 

that a certain type of' risk increases :.,ilh size. 

( Druckel'. 1973; Porter. 1.9(0). 

(6) Finally, as firms grow, th hierarchy between decision makers 

and the market Decomes ::)Ore conplex. Doth the speed and the 

quality of decision maldng can, i.n Elccordnnce. suffer. 

'(Starr, 1975; Williamsoll, J9(7) 
The inflllcnce of both size advantages and disRdv.clntuges is a 
concave profitability (rettru cn aSbets) curve where 
profitability .first increases to 3 certain level <'lno then 
starts dQcrcnsing. Profi,tubility ir:crease!ct as 101;g <.IS the 
advantl1ges of size out\·,eiBh its ;;!isadn'(ltages. After a certain 
level of si~e, however J th.e dismh'[mtages !:>tart incn:Msing and ­
the advantoges beeo!!:e exha'Jsted~ 
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FIGURE TWO r 
r:::: efficiency 1 Learning curve_~ •... organization 
ADVANTAGES • . • ••. 
Z. Better use 
"of equipment 
3 Process innovation 
4 Product redesign 
5 Image/Goodwill 
.... :_.- ,,-~ ­
EXPERIENCE ~.. 
Attachment to routines 
emphasis on hierarchy 
DISADVANTAGES; Lower adaptability ..• 
lower flexibility 
The specific sha:;e of the concave profitability curve (the 
behaviour of 'its first and second d..,riv3tes), varies consicier.;J.bly 
from rr.arket to market depending upon tbe exte:1t of the presence 
of the size advantages and t1i5advan~a2es in those markets. 
III. 2 - EXP~J\IEtlCE EFFEG'S 
When diversifying into a new market, there is an increase in 
sales per year f as well as an incre41se in the cU:Julativ"e sales 
volume of the oq,ani.zotion (experience effect). Experience has 
severa) advant3ges:(1)' the learning curvt;;(2) better use of 
equipment.(3)· process innovation.(4) prod::lct rr,odiHcations 
(better knowlEcg.e of how to adapt the product to customer nefds), 
ami (5) bet-ter imc,.ge .(HeddJeYt 1976; Henderson, 1980 t tho:npson, 
1981). 
Indeed, ceterjs paribus. older firms benefit from u better 
image than younger ones~ since cusi::on:ers tend to nss0s-iate firms 
the age of a firm with survival of the fittest. 
fIGOHF, T\-:O AB{)CT HER£ 
It has beer: point~d out that experience may also bring some 
disadvantages. Indeed, as experience increaACS, the adnptnhility 
of 'the firci a~ a '..hole n:ay decrease. .\5 eXjler ience grows, 
organizations tcr:d to revelo!; stri(tcr routin~s, h; !:lOre attache,! 
to hiear'chical rC:!2tiofls and ~o be>'::o:ne less flexlhle (Blair~ 1972; 
Albernathy and \"'aync, 1974). 
DIVERSITY r~,FECTS 
Besides siz€ and ~xperience effects, there is a third type of 
effect which occt:rs ",:-:e:-, a firm diversifies. \,'p shall call this 
type diversity effects. Diversity effects ar0 those which 
cannot be achieved by an increase in sales i:1 till:" sume product 
market cannot flchiev~. This distinguishes diversity effects from 
size a:1u exp€':rience effects which may occur both vith an increase 
in size in a sin3le Froduct 'Harket or with diversification (AS 
long as the markets which the fin:: diversifies into arc related, 
and therefore alJow for resource sharing, tnmsfer of knowJedge, 
and other benefits). 
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. FIGURE THREE 

I 
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Figure thtee Dtesents the advantages and the disad'vantoges of 
diversity. The advantages can he divided' into four main 
cathegorie5~ . 
(1) Risk rlecrease 
(2) Externalities 
• (3) - Greater organizat.ional p{)ssibl~lities. 
• 
FIGURE 'r.:REE ABOuT IiERE 
(l) D~versity brings a decrease in risk in terms of both 
critical contingencies u:1d variance (AI~ihud and Lev,1981). Lower 
risk ..... ill~ in -its turlJ, ir,iplles! • 
A - lower personnel costs { workers can be transferred from 

one SBU, fa another~ illstead of being hired and £:ired as each 

divisions sales go up and down.)-i'lechlin. 1980. 

/B - lower capital costs (being risk 3verst),,'invcstors 

demand lower interest from less risky firms)­
C - higher R ,&·li benefits (Te.rrYt 1981i Pitts, 1985) due: to! 

higher probability that 

Cl a given R&D project will bo useful to one of the 
di visions 
C2 within the organization there is all the 
required knowledge to complete the R&D project 
C3 - the' failure and success of projects will offset each 
other (lUI'J of Jarge nU;li>ers)am: therefore the organization can 
undertake projects of higher risk. 
D ~-It has also heen ~ointed out that to tho extent that 

employees are transferred dffiong SBUs rather than hired and fired, 

their motivation level >lill increase.(tiechlin~ 1980)~ 

(2) The second type of diversity advantages are externalities. 

Economists u>?fine ext!?tnalities as the bencfi t of i3 second 

party due to the wGrk of a first p3rty~ Inside Fin oTt;:anizl:'Ition 

.three 	types of externalities rnay occur! w~netary, technological 
and consumption. 
(:\) Honetary externalities result. from Ci'OSS subsidization 

at:lQng SBUs (:ihplying tax adventdeeS 3n,_ JT<·nter fr~C'do1!1 to 

finance market share buiJ tHil!; as ccmvarct' to a situation where 

funds ....·ere su~plied by external sources) and vertical int0grvtion_ 

{lower transaction costs, savings tn energYl transportation and 
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distribution j et.c) - Kitching, 1974; ~inn and Hchagell~ 1981; 
Harrigan, 1985. 
(D) 'fechnologici:ll externalities regard the transfer, of :Zouw-how 
among snus, That know-how can respect to hoI<.' to set up a distri­
bution channel, how to train the sa10S fo!"cc j ?low tu advertise u 
given product, hm. to Bolve a w8chine breakdm.n. which type of 
supplier is more reliablt' in terms of fluality I'md d~)ivery. etc.( 
Bere.1979; Yavi!::z, ~e\"man 1932 ).Techno1ogicdl cxter:-;a'.d-ties (yay 
also involve a specific skUl of the l~6.D, engineering, 
manufactur lng or any other deP<lrtn:cnt \1hicn the orgBnization 
possesses, and which will be useful in the new market (h'clls. 
1984). 
ee) Consu.~ptiQn (>xter::alHies nrc related' to' the market pL:.H::e. 
They are lwither ~Lonet8ry in their cssenct:' 001: based in knQt.I-how. 
Two main types of consumption externalities exist: transfer of 
image among SHUs (where onc.snu benefits fro,,, th~ image .another 
sau enjoys in the market) a:,d externalitius rc1<:.ted to consu21ers' 
perceptions.(Lor~ng€, eLul. 1986; Hells, 1984) / ... 
. . 	 ­
Sometimes the cllstor1f'r perceives the product "purch;]sed 8S 
being larger than what,l& supplieu by an organizdtiof\. This leads 
firms to add net·! 'i tems to their product line so that the total 
offering is as brano as the C\l?ton~rsr perct:j)tion ·of the product. 
That' is the .paBon behind the broadennin::;. of thC" off(.'r of 
computer orga;)iz'Jtions, [ron hardware into service. software and 
cowlUlmicat.ions :,-etworks. .SimiLul y, auditing firms h:we 
diversified into bc~rvices suc::-, £is taxation, '-!cCotmting. 
management consultir:.g and managc~lent recrultin;;;. 
(Hiles and Snm,', 1980). 
(3) Finally a diversified orgiDnization can do thtn~;s that no 
speCialized organizat ion can without thrci.ltenning its very 
exist<lnce. Exr.Hnple:: are the engage;r.ent in high risk rV:,;) Vr:>jects 
or business v(;,!lturt-;;. Another eXd::1ple is E'asier aeces;. to 
retailers when they prefer to deal with suppliers whi:::::' offer a 
broad line of products such as in the autonob1Je and the 2,fOcery 
products induEitry (Porter. JS~'~O e 1985). Still diver::>ified 
'organizatiml;;" 	 Cdn also impose rec-iprocd] lJuyin; ....here one 5!3U 
buys from;1 given Sll;'plier if 0"': only if the supplier burs froM 
another SElf of the same organization. (A))e!!. 1975; SLeiner. 
1975). 
Besides advantages, diversity can gIso bring two maio types of 
disadvantazes. So:ne di;;Ddvantagcs nre specific to vel:"tical 
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integration (higher risk duc to concentration of resources). 
Other disadvanta!'es pertain to diversity - in Bene-ral. Sinceo 
diversity imp;les an increUBe,in infort:lf}tion processin2: needs, it 
requires more cDmplex structure,. infor::<ation, control and 
coordinatioTi syste'l"S (Gn] braitn and :iathason. 1979; Hal'~br ick 
1983); rUII and H03kisson. J 987). 
It is the jQint. effect of size, experience and diversity 
which explains hCM the overall -perfoYnsnce af an ort:,anization can 
be different f:om the average performance a.f its division if they 
were independent 7lusinesses (tlwt is how synergy can occur). 
Positive synergy will exist only if a certain 
"\ 	 divel'si f iea ti on move implies size I expcrience and diversi t y 
advantages which outweisth their disadvantages. :;:egnUve synergy 
will exist whe:l. the advantages 3!?soc;i.ated with sizif. experience 
a'nd divers'ity are less i"IPOrt8:1t than their." f1isadynntages 
111 Scheme • 
I. 
, t'l-:rease {advantage 
in size- disadvantages of size 
diversificatio~ increase advantage of Level 
(1) in ... 	 experience .. of 
experience { disadvantages Synergy 
of 
diversity 
As a consequence~ the syperglstic potentiu] of any 
diversificution tnove :lll1st De evaluated Oll a case by case basis by 
assessing the extent of the size. 0xp!!rience and dh'Cfsity 
advantages and dis3Jvantagt's ihlplied by that diversification move 
(Allen ct al. 1<)81; Salter o,.ci ~\Cin;'o\JJ 1981) 
(1) means ~implies. 
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.FIGURE FOUR 

SYllergy effect 
, 
" 
,
,v . I ~ 
o 1 2 N N:;;;:::: Ditersi ty ano 
volume level 
• -I • , • , \ l , ._~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Y Number of markets 
(divisions) 
NOTE: One assumes that:l - each diversification st~p (through'internal development or acquisition) 
.. 
leads to a new division specialized in a given market; 2 - each diversificatIon move brings the 
Seme augment in volume and diversity to the firm. 
It is I?os$ible~ ho.....evcr I to develop certain general rules 
regarding synergy., The next section will present a model which in 
general tenr.s indicates when synergy is expected to be positive 
and large. positive sad low, and I~egative. 
IV SY~JERGY .Mill. DIVEil.SIFiC,\:'10N 
Let's suppose that an organization specialized in' a sing,le 
market starts a process of civersification Kllien over time* will 
lead the organization' to ado new market.s (through inten,:>l 
developnent or acquisition) to its operations. 
We shall assume that each division handles £l single mar~et 
and that consf''1uC''::t1Yt as the nutlDor of mark~':.s the orgadzation 
operates in increases, so does its number of divisions. For 
simplification purposes it .will also be as",w:led that each new 
oorket (division) brings a similar amount of increase in 
diversity and volume (sdles) to the organizP-tion. FJnally. it is 
l1ypothesized that the organization does not function tiS a simple 
holding~ buying and selling £inns which remain totally autonomous 
from each other.' but as an integrated e:otity where the heed 
office perfor;ns some functions for the divisions and there is an 
exchange of resources a~ong th~m. 
The questicn is As the or9;anizatioll kee;>l:' on adding new 
markets (afld divisions) to i~s opt~rations. ~()W .'1hould we ex[,cct 
the overall organiz'J:100 to perform conpDred to the overage 
performance of its divisions if th..ey were independent 
businesses? 
Based on the model of synerg)" developed above and on the 
existant empirical evidence, one should expect the fo110\>l10g 
relationship should be expected between synergy find 
diyersification. sholJl d be expee ted. 
(see figure fou~) 
INSr::::T FIGi]~f. FOU;~ ABOU;' :mRE 
The vertical axis of figure four represents the level of 
synergy. tn3t is, the q'Jotient betv:een the ELlA or tbc diversified 
organization ancl the average of its divisions. The horizontal 
axis represents the dLversifitution process. ,,:here c~ch step in 
the process represents the introduction of a now market and ­
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division to the realm of the organization.. For simplification 
reasons, one vssumes that the increase in volume and diversity 
implied by each new market division is bi;nilar. 
As can be seen. the diagram has three nain zones. In the first 
zone, t.he SYIlC'rgy level is po.siti'le a:)(j increasing. in the secon.d 
zone, synergy is decreasing, and in the third zon~. synergy is 
negative. yle will next expJain why one should expect a curve. of 
such n shaVe in the diagram of synergy. 
• 
FIRST ZO:;E (Synergy positive and increasing). 
Two reasons lead to expect that in the- early stages of a 
diversification _move (Jow level of size and div,.?rsity) synergy 
...-ill be positive aoci incr('asfng~ 
First, by increasing its total voluMe of sales and 
diversity? the corporation LS able to exploit 
> 
the size, 
experience and diversity advantagqs which we~.e discllssed 
above.ObelL .. ) Since diversity is low, there is little 
difficulty in exploiting experience and size.' benefits. Low 
diversity (high relatedness) means that c-xperience and knm-:-how is 
transferable from'one'division to another. Quantity discounts 
occur because (li visions purchase the same type of inputs. Fixed 
costs are shared ;;::::lOng divisions. t;arer.\>uses harbour [)ro£:llcts 
from various divisions, and so on,.(J\aker? i9'34; L~!.'ange et a1 
1976) • 
. Second, the disadvantages of size and diversity are expected 
to be relatively sinal I at this stage since as has been pointed 
out, -they tend to occur ot high levels of size and diversity. 
(Scherer, .1979; Shepherd. 1979), 
For these reasons it should be expected that as firms 
add volume and Jiversity to their operations. s;'aergy will 
increase~ 
After a certain level of diversity and volume however, 
synergy will start decreasing. 
seCOND ZOirE :Synergy positive and decreasing 
Several reasons contribute to this. First as has bt>etl 
pointed out (Pfefier and Sal,;l:ncik, 1977) after a certain Jevel, 
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marginal increases in volume and diversity will brin:; diminishing 
returns (law of diminishin;t, ret;lrns): Savings in machinery hi1:1t; 
fixed costs become variable; the leArning ~urve frntt~urs; 
augments b specialization bring no fur,thcr significunt benefit!:>; 
discontinuities in resources are exploited to their full 
extenL (3aio, 1954 :;:lnd 1956) 1:i:;h levell'> of diversity also mcan 
that the ilr1<:lgc, the knowhow cnd 'expcrtise and the in[1ucnc;c 'Jpon 
the various stakeholders is now more difficult to transport 
from one oi vision to another. The consmler perceives the 
divisional products as iJJlrel{Jted and therefore he is less 
induced to buy one when he buys another of the same 
organizatio~; and so on. (Tare, 1977; Brock~ 1975). 
High levels of diversity have a negative effect 00 the 
pos~ibility of exploiting site:e Hod experience benefits, High 
diversity (Low relatedness) among the narket ,,'hich the 
organizution is in, means that the divisiondJ inputs are 
dlfferent. Therefore. theft' is less room for quantity rli,sccounts. 
the activities of fewer departments car: be share:! 3hlOHg the 
divisions. maddnery differs from division to division. each 
divisio:l has its 0",'[1 learnIng curve, and so on • (Wells? 19H4; 
Porter. 1987). .­
/' 
/ 
! 
Finally, at, high levels of volume and d'iversity, their 
disadvantages be~O)fle'l Significant. The complexity of the 
information processing requi.res e] aborate strut;.; tures ~ 
inforrJation, control and coordination systems (Hann<:ln and 
Freeman. 1977). Decision ::laking becomes slot.'er and its qua li t Y 
SUiftTS fror.: the ,":'l:nbcr of hicn:rchical layers belween decision 
makers and the murkct;O':ilJi':L:lson, . Fn6). T:-Ie -orgdnizatioo 
develops attachE',ent. to routines and hierarchy losing flexibiJ i ty 
(Albernathy and i>iclYflO, 1974). ::otivation is ::.lore difficult (Quir:fl 
end Nangione, 1973). the organization environment becol::es highly 
political and prone to the formati.on of coalitions (Tot.'send, 
1970}. 
THIRD Z():~E n<:fgative synergy . 
Three reasons contribute to the existance of negative 
< synergy. 

At high levels of vQlume and diversity t e adv~otage of size, 

experience and diversity <re eXhclli.'::>tt'd or minimal du~~ to t.he 18\1 

of diminishing retur:1S ( Rcbicson~ 1954; 13; in t 1956). 

Furtherl:!Ofe. as has hee:1 pointed out, ( Terry, 1981i Aaker j 
1984; Porter, 1985)the advantuges 0': diversity beco!re 
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disadvantages. That is, both consunption and technQlogical 
positi.ve externallties may become neg?tive ~ externalities. For 
instance, the i:nage of one division may nann another division 
(e.g. pharmaceutical ;:-roducts and food, subcompacts and luxury 
cars, low price items and high quality products), ar.d the 
experience and kno~~how of one narket may be pernicious when 
•
applied to another rl1ar~et. (1) 
Third, since volume and diversity are now very large, their 
disArlvontoses prevail (x ir:eficiency. low motjvation~ decision 
making proble!r.s. cOr.lplex information and control s),stt,ms I 
coalitio:1 :ormation for political purposes, etca).(Arrow, 1974j 
Williamson. 1975; A!drich~ 1950). 
As a C'onscquenct? of the experience, size and diversity 
advantages being low and t!wir disadvfmtagcs being 
importal1t, synergy can be expected to be negatiVE! (Scherer. 
1986; Ansoff, 1984) 
(1) In such a case tr.e best option for an organization is to 
grant corr,plete autonomy to its divisions and achieve zero,( and not negative) synergy. 
f 
CONCLUSION 
There has recently been a rene~~d interest in the concept 
of synergy - to predict success in mer?,.Pts, and to advise ,.ihich 
diversification strategies organizations shopld 
follow. Tbis requires advancements in the exploration of the 
concept of synergy. Such has been the purpose of thjs or tic] e. 
The basic contributions of this articl~ can be summarized 
as follows! 
1 - There are lIot one, but three t:lain causes of synergy: 
. size, experience a:ld diversity effects. '\]1 three contribute to 
the possibility that the pcrfQrmanct of n diversified 
corporation will be difl crent from the Plera;:;e performance of 
its divisions if they were independent' bus .nesscs. That is. all 
three i:nply the possibility that a diver ;ificatiun r:1()ve 
creates econo~ic value. 
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2 - Size and experience advnntages can be culled by an 
o'rganization either throllgh spc<:ializa~ion in a single pr.oduct 
market or by related diversification. Diversity advantages are 
those lhhich only diversity among If'..drkets can bring about. 
3 - There are several types of size, experience and 
diversity effects. It is the level of thelr presence when an 
organization diversifies inLo a new market w~)ich '.dll determine 
the amount of sYj-lergy tbat will' be created. As a consequence, the 
synergistic potenlinl of <l diversification move must be evaluated 
on a case by case basis. 
4 - It is possible however. to develop certi::1in general 
rules regardine synergy. Based on the caus.es <;>f synergy and its 
behaviQr as a function of slze j experience and divcrsity, it can 
be expected th:it ~s 'nn organization st;;Jrt.s <1 -diversification 
process. the amOU:lt of synergy will first increase, then 
decrease alld f i noll y be zero ~ 
4' 
5 - Resour::e s!turing. arid synergy are not synony[l:ou$~ 
Resource sharing is only one oE the causes of synergy, the others 
being: 
- ,
risk decreasals ( vhich dim'tnishs personna], capital and 
R&D costs. " 
an increase in the orga:1izatiofl" s possi bilities (in terms 
of market power. accest; to rQtai]er.s~ etc). 
input ef[ -'-cts (lo~/eL price, ]O\ver tran.sportut.lon costs, 
etc)~ 
higher productivity of the r<)SOUrCi;$ due to employees' 
specialization und learning, mechanization of activities and the 
geometric Jaw. 
6 - There can be t.hree basic categories of resource 
sharing; Public resourcC's (leases, patents, imnge and 
visibility of the organiZ3tion as a whole) half public 
resources (implyinG technologL:al, cOrlsu!::ption and ;notletary 
external Hies) - o.nd private resources (such as machinery I 
warehouses, sales force, trucks. etc.). 
7 - Last, at high levels of diversity ,:m:1 vol ume. the 
d1sadvantGses of sizl.!t experience and diversity vill prevail over 
their 8dvantages~ Consequently, syt1ergy ~ill be neg;ltive. 
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In such a CUSE. the best option for ao orgaoizatioo woald 
be to give complett? autonomy to its div:islons. and by becoming a 
pure holding, ilchicVQ zero level of synergy. 
,,­
/ 
! 
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